The design of bin Laden's compound may have ultimately contributed to his discovery.A former CIA official involved in the manhunt told The Washington Post, "The place was three stories high, and you could watch it from a variety of angles." The CIA used a process called "red teaming" on the collected intelligence to independently review the circumstantial evidence and available facts of their case that bin Laden was living at the Abbottabad compound.( UTC, May 1) by United States Navy SEALs of the U. Naval Special Warfare Development Group (also known as DEVGRU or SEAL Team Six). According to the earlier official version of his identification from a U. official, identification of al-Qaeda couriers was an early priority for interrogators at CIA black sites and the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, because bin Laden was believed to communicate through such couriers while concealing his whereabouts from al-Qaeda foot soldiers and top commanders. One of those claims came from Mohammed al-Qahtani, a detainee interrogated for 48 days more or less continuously between November 23, 2002, and January 11, 2003.

The compound had no Internet or landline telephone service. The CIA team used informants and other techniques – including a widely criticized fake polio vaccination program drone before, during and after the raid on the compound.

Its residents burned their refuse, unlike their neighbors, who set their garbage out for collection. The NGA created three-dimensional renderings of the house, created schedules describing residential traffic patterns, and assessed the number, height and gender of the residents of the compound.

Because both Mohammed and al-Libbi had minimized al-Kuwaiti's importance, officials speculated that he was part of bin Laden's inner circle.

Pakistani officials in 2011 stated the courier's name was Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed, from Pakistan's Swat Valley.

The official passed polygraph tests, after which the U. began local and satellite surveillance of bin Laden's Abbottabad residence. According to the official, retired CIA officials emphasized the importance of bin Laden's courier to the press, because they were nervous over torture scrutiny and possible prosecution.

intelligence that bin Laden had been located by Pakistani ISI in 2006, and held under house arrest near Pakistani intelligence and military centers ever since. intelligence official speaking to Hersh, bin Laden was ill at this point, financially supported by some within Saudi Arabia, and kept by the ISI to better manage their complex relationship with Pakistani and Afghan Islamist groups.

The CIA led the effort to surveil and gather intelligence on the compound; other critical roles in the operation were played by other United States agencies, including the National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and U. which, among other things, is specialized in surreptitiously installing spyware and tracking devices on targeted computers and mobile-phone networks.

Because of the work of the Tailored Access Operations group, the NSA could collect intelligence from mobile phones that were used by al-Qaeda operatives and other "persons of interest" in the hunt for bin Laden.

In addition to DEVGRU, participating units included the United States Army Special Operations Command's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) and CIA operatives. Later in 2003, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged operational chief of al-Qaeda, stated that he was acquainted with al-Kuwaiti, but that the man was not active in al-Qaeda, according to a U. Ghul revealed that al-Kuwaiti had not been seen in some time, which led U. officials to suspect he was traveling with bin Laden.